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GOVERNMENT BY JURY
As the various English colonies in America came to establish
independent state governments and later a federal government
they very generally provided in their constitutions for a per-
petuation of that common law institution in judicial procedure
then and since known as "trial by jury." Thus, in Connecticut,
it was provided that "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate"; in Massachusetts, that "In all controversies concern-
ing property and in all suits between two or more persons,
except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise used
and practiced, the parties have a right to trial by jury"; in
New Jersey, that "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate"; in Virginia, that "The trial by jury is preferable to
any other and ought to be held sacred." In the Federal Consti-
tution the language is "In suits at common law where the value
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved." As new states came into the union,
except perhaps a few of those within the last decade, they made
similar provisions.
The term almost universally used is "trial by jury," but rarely
was there any attempt to define the term or to state its elements.
Evidently it was assumed that the term had by that time become
so familiar, and its elements and attributes so fixed and well
understood, that definition was unnecessary. "Trial by jury"
meant to the people of the colonies that known to the common
law of England and brought to and adopted in the colonies as
an institution of that law. Thus, in the Maryland constitution
it was declared "That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled
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to the common law of England and the trial by jury according
to the course of that law." In the Federal Constitution it was
provided that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States than according to
the rules of the common law." Indeed it has all along been
assumed that the "trial by jury" sought to be preserved was the
English common law trial by jury with all its elements and inci-
dents. The three words "trial by jury" connoted all those
elements and incidents.
For instance, the jury was to consist of twelve men, free-
holders of the county, selected and summoned by designated offi-
cers to attend before a judge of one of the common law courts
to try under his direction, not the cases themselves, but only the
issues of fact developed by the pleadings. They were not to
render judgment, but only to answer questions of fact and then
only when all twelve were agreed as to what the answer should
be. They were to have the benefit of hearing the witnesses, the
arguments of counsel, and the instructions of the judge upon
matters of law and of his analysis of the evidence and of his
comments, and even opinion, on the evidence if he deemed it
necessary for their enlightenment; always, however, in such case
reminding them that they were to answer according to their own
opinion based upon the law and the evidence and not accord-
ing to his opinion. It was such a trial the parties were
entitled to by the common law, and their right to have the
judge give the jury the benefit of his analysis and comments
whenever he deemed it necessary for their full enlightenment
was unquestioned. The term "trial by jury" connoted this
right as much as any other.
Thus Sir Matthew Hale, writing of "trial by jury" about the
middle of the seventeenth century and but a few years after
the English settlements in America, wrote, "Another excellency
of this trial is this; that the judge is always present at the time
of the evidence given upon it (the issue of fact). Herein he
is able in matters of law emerging upon the evidence to direct
them; and also in matters of fact to give them great light and
assistance by his weighing the evidence before them and observ-
ing where the question and knot of the business lies; and show-
ing them his opinion even in matters of fact, which is a great
advantage and light to laymen."1
'Hale's Hist. of the Common Law, Ch. XlI.
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The full discretion of the judge as to when and to what extent
the case required him to analyze and comment upon the evidence
and even express his own opinion upon it does not seem to have
been questioned in England till well into the nineteenth century,
and in the few cases where it was questioned the exercise of the
discretion was sustained. A few citations will illustrate the
English understanding of "trial by jury" in that respect.
In Balcher v. Prittie,2 Tindal, L. C. J., "summed up the case
to the jury with strong remarks in favor of the defendant, yet
the whole facts were submitted to them and they were at liberty
to exercise their discretion." Held, "not sufficient ground for
saying the jury were misdirected."
In Solarte v. Melville," one question was whether certain
transactions were usurious. Tenterden, L. C. J., "told the jury
that in his opinion the transactions were not usurious" but left
the question to the jury for the exercise of their own judgment.
The jury found in accord with the Chief Justice's expressed
opinion. Held, that his expression of opinion was no ground
for a new trial.
In Davidson v. Stanley,4 Baron Rolfe "left the case to the
jury with strong observations upon the weakness of the evidence
offered to support the plaintiff's case and particularly as to the
non-production of the pass book, and as to the absence of a wit-
ness." Held, no ground for a new trial, Tindal, C. J., remarking
that the judge "was perfectly justified in stating the precise
effect of the evidence on his own mind."
Whoever has heard the "summing up" by English judges of
to-day in jury cases will be satisfied that the right of the judge
to analyze and comment upon the evidence and even express his
opinion thereon still exists in full vigor in England. I do not
know of any effort there to abridge that right.
The judges of the Federal courts of the United States exercise
the same right as a part of their common law powers. The
United States Supreme Court in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof
said": "Trial by jury is a trial by twelve men in the presence
and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct
them on the law and to advise them on the facts and (except
on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if
'4 Moore-Scott 295.
'7 B. & C. 43o.
'3 Scott N. R. 49.
174 U. S. 13.
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in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence. This propo-
sition has been so generally admitted and so seldom contested
that there has been little occasion for its distinct assertion." The
court also quoted from Sir Matthew Hale the following: "It
(trial by jury) has the judge's observation, attention and assist-
ance in points of law by way of decision and in points of fact
by way of direction to the jury." Evidently Lord Hale meant
by "direction" merely pointing, indicating, guiding, not com-
manding.
The same court had previously declared the same truth. In
Vicksburg R. R. Co. v. Putnam, it said: "In the courts of the
United States as in those of England, from which our practice
was derived, the judge in submitting a case to the jury may at
his discretion whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in
arriving at a just conclusion comment upon the evidence, call
their attention to parts of it which he thinks important and
express his opinion on the facts."7
Although thus far there has been no attempt in England to
deprive the jury and the parties of this assistance of the judge
when helpful to a correct finding, nor in this country as to the
Federal courts, yet in many states have been enacted statutes
designed to effect such deprivation. Even in Massachusetts it
has been enacted that "The courts shall not charge the juries
with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and
the law"; a most gracious permission for which the Massachu-
setts judges should be duly grateful. In Illinois, the legislature
has undertaken to enact that the judge "shall only instruct as to
the law of the case" and even that only in writing; also that he
shall either give or refuse a requested instruction and that he
shall "in no case after instructions are given, qualify, modify,
or in any manner explain the same to the jury otherwise than
in writing." In Georgia, if in any case, during its progress or
in his charge to the jury, the judge shall "express or intimate
his opinion as to what has or has not been proved" it is ordered
by the legislature that a new trial be granted. In Kansas, the
legislature requires the judge to write out and number his
instructions, though he may read them to the jury, but he must
do so before the counsel make their arguments to the jury. In
0118 U. S. 545, 553.
'See also U. S. v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 123 U. S. 113, 114; Thompson v.
Utah, 153 U. S. lO2, io6; Cooley on Const. Law, 239.
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Oregon the constitution declares that "the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate," but the statute declares that the judge
in charging the jury "shall not present the facts of the case."
The foregoing are sufficient for examples of the efforts of
legislatures to shear the "trial by jury" of an important element
connoted by the term itself. I advance the proposition that such
statutes in spirit and effect violate the constitutional provisions
for the preservation of "trial by jury," and do this by elimi-
nating what I hope I have shown to be as much an element of
such a trial as some others which legislatures have not yet pre-
sumed to abolish. For discussion of this proposition the reader
is referred to a paper read by former Supreme Court Justice
Henry B. Brown before the American Bar Association in 1889.
Of course, in those few states where the constitution itself
eliminates that element no such question can arise.
But, apart from the constitutional question suggested, I advance
the further proposition that such elimination militates against
accuracy in the administration of justice and in effect tends to
substitute an irresponsible government by jury for a responsible
government of laws. Jurors have no such sense of responsi-
bility, no such desire to justify their decisions as do judges.
Jurors are called in for the particular case or cases and then
dismissed back to private life. They are no longer jurors, no
longer in the public view. They have no reputation for ability,
integrity or faithfulness to maintain. They fall back into the
multitude and are lost to sight. Not so with the judges, who
still remain judges and in the public view; who desire and must
maintain a reputation for ability, integrity, learning and faith-
fulness; who are constantly at the bar of public opinion and
cannot hide in the crowd and be forgotten.
In early times there was much less need than now of a power
in the judges to comment and even express opinions on the evi-
dence. In those times the cases were few and simple in com-
parison with the cases now. The old system of special pleading
developed single and precise issues to which the jury were con-
fined and which required no great effort to solve. To-day many
of the cases brought before a jury are complex and complicated,
requiring careful and prolonged attention for an understanding
of them. The abolition of special pleading has made the issues
of fact less precise and clear. Now more than ever does a jury
need the assistance of an able judge in clarifying the issues, in
showing them the application and value of different items of
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evidence, and indeed indicating how this or that bit of evi-
dence impresses his own mind. One having the duty of deciding
questions of fact, if he be conscientious and painstaking as a
juror should be, naturally desires to ascertain how this or that bit
of evidence impresses another, and especially another known to
be intelligent, experienced and disinterested. In deciding upon
any important business proposition we often and properly submit
the evidence for or against to others in whose disinterestedness,
intelligence and clear vision we have confidence, though we our-
selves have the responsibility of the decision. We wish for a
check upon our own impressions.
Long continued effort to reason connectedly is always more
or less fatiguing, especially for those who do not make a business
of it. All of us are liable at times to "slip a cog" in the process
and to draw inferences that a more patient analysis will show
to be incorrect. With men unaccustomed to reason carefully
and patiently, the argument post hoc ergo propter hoc is often
accepted and the more readily where no personal interest of their
own is at stake. How often do we find that argument used in
political discussions? While one political party is in power
there comes a recurring period of business depression and the
administration is blamed as the cause. Another party comes
into power and later the business of the country revives; there-
fore the new administration is entitled to the credit.
A power in the judge to remind the jury of the incorrectness
of such inferences, to expose that and other fallacies with which
the arguments of counsel often abound, to show them the pro-
bative force or want of probative force of the various evidence
adduced would seem to be often essential to the correctness of
their decisions. The science of proof is not always a matter
of common knowledge. To determine whether a proposition of
fact is actually proved by the evidence submitted is not always
easy. To determine the proper weight of any particular evi-
dence requires some knowledge of the principles of logic. To
comprehend the correlation of different items of a large mass
of evidence pro and con requires special ability and train-
ing. Whoever will read the evidence given at the famous Tich-
borne Trial, with its enormous mass of circumstances, will see
the need for that most masterly and luminous analysis of it by
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, who did not hesitate to tell the
jury what consideration he thought should be given to the vari-
ous parts of the evidence and to show them the correlation of
the different parts.
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Again, the steadying influence of an able judge is often neces-
sary to prevent miscarriage of justice in criminal cases. The
jurors drawn from the vicinage share to a greater or less extent
the current sympathies or prejudices of the community for or
against the accused and, further, they feel the pressure of them
during the trial. The crowd of spectators, even though silent,
in some mysterious way has an influence. I think every judge
in a trial exciting great interest and drawing great crowds has
himself been conscious of such influence. Under this influence
persons notoriously guilty under the law are often acquitted,
and often other accused persons are convicted, even against the
weight of evidence, because of the demand for a victim when
the public has been outraged by some hideous crime. We have
a recent instance of the latter in the "Frank case" in that
Georgia which has undertaken to forbid the judge in his charge
or during the trial to express or "intimate" an opinion on the
evidence in the case. It is now, after cool reflection, very gen-
erally believed that the evidence against him was untrustworthy
and insufficient. Had there been upon the bench an unfettered
judge to show the jury that untrustworthiness and insufficiency,
the result might have been different.
It does not follow, however, that the final decision should be
left with the judge, and the jury dispensed with. The plain
men of the jury, drawn from the various occupations of com-
mon life, if not misled by appeals to their emotions or by
plausible but fallacious arguments, are better triers of what is
probable or improbable in motive and conduct in human affairs
than are the judges taken from one single profession and set
apart from the current of daily affairs. The jury acts as a
negative on the judge. He must express his views publicly, if
at all. The jury knows and is reminded that it need not accept
his views. He can influence them only by the clearness of his
reasoning. Neither one should be left alone to consider and
decide upon the evidence. It is the combination of the two,
the skilled reasoner and the twelve plain men of affairs, the lat-
ter having the last word, that constitutes the constitutional "trial
by jury" and the best tribunal yet devised for decision of issues
of fact.
It is interesting to inquire what interests and influence pro-
cured from so many legislatures the above described and
attempted elimination of such an important element of trial by
jury. The result is that the more experienced, able, eloquent
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and shrewd counsel is given an immense advantage over the less
experienced, able, eloquent and shrewd. There is no one to
bring about an equilibrium. The jury is left under the influence
of able, partisan counsel without any steadying, corrective
influence of an impartial judge. I was a member of the
judiciary committee of the Maine Legislature when the Maine
statute forbidding judges expressing any opinion on the
evidence was enacted. I recall the pressure from the stronger,
abler lawyers of the state to secure its enactment. To the
objection that such legislation might often work injustice to
the clients of the less able and strong, the claim was frankly
made before the committee that they were entitled to the advan-
tage of their superiority. There was no claim that verdicts
would be more likely to be right. The statute was aimed at able
and strong judges who held to their right and duty to comment,
explain and even advise in matters of evidence when they
thought it necessary for the jury's proper understanding of the
case. It was noticeable, however, that verdicts rendered before
them were very rarely set aside as against the evidence.
The day is long past when juries can be induced by any urging
or over-awing to surrender their own opinion at the end to that
of the judge. English and American legal history abounds- with
instances of juries resisting even to stubborness the insistence
of partisan judges. All the efforts of the subservient judges
in the trial of the "Seven Bishops" under James II failed to
prevent an acquittal. There is no fear in England with its
powerful judiciary that the judges may over-awe or control the
jury. Why should there be here? Again, if the power of the
court to set aside a verdict is to be retained, as it evidently
should be, why take away the power of the court to aid in secur-
ing in the first instance a verdict that should not be set aside?
Does not the former power really include the latter?
The party who feels confidence that upon the law and the
evidence to be adduced he is in the right is not the party who
would close the mouth of the judge upon questions of fact.
Indeed, as said by the late Justice Miller of the United States
Supreme Court in his article on Trial by Jury,8 "It is the
observation of all experienced practitioners that such a party is
always ready to submit his case to the court without a jury;
while the party who fancies that in appeals to the prejudices
'Am. Law Rev., Vol. 21.
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and feelings of the tribunal which tries his case he may fred
something which will induce them to depart from the strict
law pertaining to it, or to construe the evidence more favorably
to his side of the case, is generally the one who demands a jury."
This should not be. There should be some check upon any
impulse excited in a jury to disregard the law or to ignore the
fair weight of the evidence.
Taking away the centuries long approved check, taking away
the restraining, steadying influence of an able, learned and
impartial judge (as all judges should be and would be if the
people so willed) often leaves the liberty, property and reputa-
tion of the citizen practically in the power of twelve ordinary
men fortuitously assembled, without individual responsibility,
often inexperienced and unskilled in the sifting and weighing
of evidence, forbidden the aid of disinterested experts, and often
prone to decide upon impulse or first impressions rather than
after patient, dispassionate, laborious reasoning. In the last
analysis it subjects the citizen to a government by jury, instead
of a government by law.
Lucius A. EmEy.
fAiNFE, January, 1915.
